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Abstract
We investigate a recent political theory of institutional change according to which
institutions of economic freedom are more likely to be adopted at the extreme cases
of strong and weak political competition than at cases in between. We ﬁnd that
such a U-shaped relationship is veriﬁed when controlling for other political variables
and past economic growth, but disappears when controlling for the initial level of
development. In this case, the relationship between political competition and the
adoption of institutions of economic freedom appears to be positive and linear as
suggested by the political principal-agent paradigm.
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Institutions of economic freedom (largely characterized by the protection of
private property, free competition and freedom of exchange) have been repeat-
edly shown to foster economic growth and other indicators of development.
Despite this evidence, the adoption of such institutions presents great variation
across countries and over time.
Recently, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) have proposed a political theory
of institutional change according to which Pareto-improving institutions are
more likely to be adopted at the extreme cases of weak and strong political
competition than at cases in between. In the case of weak political competi-
tion, a Coase theorem type of reasoning applies: Pareto-improving institutions
are promoted by the incumbent ruler as future compensation (conﬁscation)
is assured (the incumbent ruler is not likely to be replaced ex-post). In the
case of strong political competition, a competitive market type of reasoning
analogous to the political principal-agent paradigm (Barro (1973)) applies:
Pareto-improving institutions are promoted by the incumbent ruler because,
if he does not promote them, he is likely to be replaced by the citizens. In in-
termediate cases (when the incumbent ruler is just “somewhat entrenched”),
however, Pareto-improving institutions are likely to be blocked by the incum-
bent ruler, as he fears that institutional changes could shift the economic
and political power distribution among diﬀerent groups of society and trigger
political replacement. According to this theory, therefore, the relationship be-
tween political competition and the adoption of Pareto-improving institutions
is U-shaped. 1
We investigate whether the observed adoption of institutions of economic free-
dom during the 1980-2003 period supports Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2006)
political theory of institutional change. We ﬁnd that the proposed U-shaped
relationship between political competition and the adoption of institutions of
economic freedom is veriﬁed when controlling for other political variables and
past economic growth, but disappears when controlling for the initial level
of development as captured by GDP per capita. In this latter case, the re-
lationship between political competition and the adoption of institutions of
economic freedom appears to be positive and linear as proposed by Barro’s
(1973) political principal-agent paradigm. 2
1 Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) noted that the incentives for incumbent rulers to
adopt eﬃcient institutions also increase with the level of human capital (future con-
ﬁscatory rents are higher) and the presence of external threats (falling economically
behind makes countries - and rulers - more vulnerable).
2 de Haan and Sturm (2003), Adser` a et al. (2003), and de Vanssay et al. (2005),
among others, have all found empirical support to this theory.
22 Model
We assess the U-shaped relationship between political competition and the
adoption of institutions of economic freedom using the following quadratic
form:
EFWit = α + βPolityit + γPolity
2
it + δCit + uit
where EFW is a measure of economic freedom, Polity is a measure of political
competition, C is a vector of control variables, and u is the error term. All
variables are observed for country i (i = 1,...,N) and year t (t = 1,...,T).
Dependent variable
Our measure of the adoption of institutions of economic freedom is the Eco-
nomic Freedom of the World - chain-linked summary - Index (EFW). This
index scores countries on a 0 to 10 scale where 10 represents the highest de-
gree of economic freedom (Gwartney et al. (2005)).
Political competition
Our measure of political competition is the index Polity which measures the
country’s degree of autocracy or democracy on a -10 (highest autocracy) to
10 (highest democracy) scale (Marshall and Jaggers (2002)). 3
Control variables
Party orientation: We control for the incumbent’s political orientation with
two dummy variables: Right and Left. These variables take the value of 1 if
the aﬃliation of the party is considered “right” or “left,” respectively, and
zero otherwise (Beck et al. (2001)).
Executive’s special interests: As the Public Choice literature has argued, the
adoption of eﬃcient institutions may depend on whether the executive repre-
sents groups with special interests or not. We control for this inﬂuence with
a dummy variable (Execspec) that takes the value of 1 if the party in power
is “nationalist,” represents rural or peasants’ interests, regional interests, or a
religion, and takes the value of zero otherwise (Beck et al. (2001)).
3 We have also used the Executive and Legislative Indices of Electoral Competitive-
ness (Beck et al. (2001)) which measure political competitiveness at the executive
and legislative level on a 1 to 7 scale. The results (available upon request) are
qualitatively similar.
3Autonomous regions: As de Vanssay et al. (2005) point out, competitive pres-
sures on politicians could tend to be greater in countries with competition at
the federal, state, and local levels than in countries with a uniﬁed hierarchy
where competition occurs only at the top level. The variable Auton takes the
value of 1 if the country presents contiguous autonomous regions and zero
otherwise (Beck et al. (2001)).
Past per capita GDP growth: We control for past per capita GDP growth (the
average of the previous ﬁve years) as it is likely that countries that grew faster
in the recent past, possibly because of the adoption of institutions of economic
freedom, may be inclined to increase their economic freedom in the future.
Initial per capita GDP: We also control for the initial level of development
(given by the log of the average per capita GDP level of the previous ﬁve years)
as it is also likely that wealthier countries may be inclined to adopt institutions
of economic freedom irrespective of their recent economic growth performance
(see de Haan and Sturm (2003)). As we will see below, this variable plays a
crucial role in our estimations. 4
We use a sample of 73 countries and annual data covering 1980, 1985, 1990,
1995, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003. 5
3 Estimation
Table 1 reports the results of various regressions using the methodology pro-
posed by Beck and Katz (1995) using panel corrected standard errors (PC-
SEs). 6 We control for political variables ﬁrst (column 1), past per capita GDP
growth (PpcGDPg) second (column 2), and the initial per capita GDP level
(InitGDP) third (column 3).
[Table 1 about here.]
Consistent with Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2006) proposed theory, our data
reveal the presence of a U-shaped relationship between political competition
4 Using the average of the previous ﬁve years for these last two variables smoothes
out possible short-run shocks and avoids possible problems of endogeneity. Data
from Heston et al. (2006).
5 Up to 2000 the EFW was computed every ﬁve years. We use the largest sample
of countries available after consolidating the data.
6 This methodology produces larger standard errors than OLS estimations and
correct for the overconﬁdence of the FGLS t-values. Related studies on institutional
and political variables such as Adser` a et al. (2003) and de Vanssay et al. (2005)
have also used this methodology.
4and the adoption of institutions of economic freedom when controlling for
other political variables (column 1) and past economic growth (column 2): the
linear and quadratic terms of Polity are signiﬁcant and present a negative and a
positive sign respectively. Based on these speciﬁcations, therefore, institutions
of economic freedom seem to be more likely to be adopted at the extreme
cases of weak and strong political competition than in cases in between.
The previous result disappears, however, when controlling for the initial level
of development as captured by the initial per capita GDP level (column 3).
In this case, the appropriate model appears to be consistent with the political
principal-agent paradigm as a single linear term of the political competition
variable produces a positive and strongly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient (columns 3 and
4). Importantly, although the coeﬃcient of past per capita GDP growth is al-
ways positive and highly signiﬁcant, its contribution explaining the variation
in EFW is minor when compared to the explanatory power of the initial per
capita GDP level. Indeed, the R
2 increases by 21 percent when introducing
past per capita GDP growth and by 40 percent when introducing the ini-
tial per capita GDP level (it increases by 54 percent if past per capita GDP
growth is dropped in column 3). This result suggests that while economic
growth seems to foster the adoption of institutions of economic freedom, its
cumulative eﬀect over the long run is much more important in this regard.
Initial development levels explain much of the variation of economic freedom
and render the positive eﬀect of weak political competition on this variable
(the left arm of the U as proposed by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006)), not
signiﬁcant.
In terms of the political control variables, Left is consistently negative and
signiﬁcant across all models. Right, on the other hand, is never signiﬁcant. In
line with the Public Choice literature, the variable capturing the executive’s
special interests (Execspec) presents the expected sign (negative) and is always
signiﬁcant. Finally, and contrary to what was expected, Auton seems to be
negatively related to EFW although is not always signiﬁcant. Similar results
regarding this variable have also been found by de Vanssay et al. (2005).
4 Conclusion
We investigate a recent political theory of institutional change by Acemoglu
and Robinson (2006) according to which institutions of economic freedom are
more likely to be adopted at the extreme cases of weak and strong political
competition than at cases in between. We ﬁnd that such a U-shaped relation-
ship is veriﬁed when controlling for other political variables and past economic
growth, but disappears when controlling for the initial level of development
as captured by GDP per capita. In this latter case, the appropriate model ap-
5pears to be consistent with the political principal-agent paradigm, as a single
linear term of the political competition variable produces a positive and highly
signiﬁcant coeﬃcient. Over the long run, therefore, the adoption of institutions
of economic freedom seems to be both a normal (increasing in income level
and growth) and a democratic good.
Our results also indicate that having incumbent rulers from the right does
not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the adoption of institutions of economic freedom, but
having incumbent rulers from the left is a signiﬁcant deterrence of such adop-
tion. Consistent with the Public Choice literature it also appears important
for the adoption of institutions of economic freedom that incumbent rulers do
not represent special interests, groups or religions.
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7Table 1
Panel data estimates (EFW=dependent variable)
Column no.: 1 2 3 4
Constant 5.731a (0.407) 5.420a (0.390) 0.159 (0.504) 0.517 (0.360)
Polity -0.143b (0.066) -0.103c (0.062) 0.095b (0.045) 0.054a (0.010)
Polity2 0.010a (0.003) 0.008a (0.002) -0.002 (0.002)
Auton -0.154 (0.117) -0.241b (0.110) -0.289a (0.101) -0.290a (0.103)
Execspec -0.359b (0.142) -0.328b (0.142) -0.191c (0.102) -0.212b (0.106)
Right -0.096 (0.096) -0.146 (0.095) -0.138 (0.095) -0.149 (0.093)
Left -0.341b (0.140) -0.368a (0.134) -0.280b (0.113) -0.298a (0.111)
PpcGDPg 0.122a (0.017) 0.100a (0.018) 0.099a (0.018)
InitGDP 0.573a (0.044) 0.550a (0.044)
Adjusted R2 0.309 0.374 0.520 0.519
Observations 584 584 584 584
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Signiﬁcance levels: a (1%), b (5%) and c (10%).
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